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261 
Comment on Mary Anne Case’s Enforcing Bargains 
in an Ongoing Marriage 
Robert A. Pollak  
Mary Anne Case’s paper Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing 
Marriage
1
 raises both a narrow and a broad question. The narrow 
question relates specifically to McGuire v. McGuire,
2
 which is 
commonly interpreted as standing for the proposition that courts will 
not enforce contracts between spouses in ongoing marriages.
3
 Case 
argues that this interpretation is wrong. The McGuires had no 
contract and, hence, McGuire is about status, about the obligations 
implied by marriage, not about contract.
4
 
The broad question is whether courts should enforce bargains 
between spouses in ongoing marriages. Would a willingness to 
enforce (some? most? all?) bargains be superior to the current ―love-
it-or-leave-it‖ rule?5 Economic models of bargaining in marriage 
appear to imply an affirmative answer to this question. I argue, 
however, that simple bargaining models exaggerate both the 
inefficiencies associated with the non-enforceability of contracts and 
the extent to which legal enforceability would avoid these 
inefficiencies. Accordingly, these arguments do not contradict Case’s 
claim that enforceability would improve upon the ―love-it-or-leave-
 
 
 
Hernreich Distinguished Professor of Economics in Arts & Sciences and in the Olin 
Business School at Washington University in St. Louis. 
 1. Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 225 (2011).  
 2. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953). 
 3. Case, supra note 1, at 227.  
 4. Id.  
 5. The idea that courts generally refuse to enforce bargains in ongoing marriages, dubbed 
the ―love-it-or-leave-it‖ rule by Saul Levmore, leaves couples to negotiate amongst themselves 
or obtain a divorce. Id. at 225 (quoting Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 226 (1995)).  
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it‖ rule, but they do suggest that the magnitude of the improvement 
would be relatively small. 
The first economic models of bargaining in marriage, which were 
developed by Manser and Brown
6
 and McElroy and Horney,
7
 were 
published in the early 1980s in the International Economic Review.
8
 
Traditional economic analysis treated a married couple as if it were a 
single ―economic agent‖ that maximizes a utility function subject to a 
resource or budget constraint.
9
 Economists refer to models in which 
economic agents maximize a utility function subject to a resource 
constraint as ―unitary models.‖10 Traditionally, economists simply 
assumed that the unitary model, which is usually introduced in the 
context of an individual consumer, applied directly to married 
couples. Samuelson, in a throw-away section of a paper on the theory 
of international trade, pointed out that the usual treatment of married 
couples, whom he referred to as ―Dr. Jekyll and Mrs. Jekyll,‖ was 
problematic.
11
 Samuelson identified the problem, but had little 
interest in modeling allocation within marriage. 
Gary Becker, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1992, put 
the study of the family, including marriage, on the agenda of 
economics. Becker’s ―altruist model‖ of allocation in marriage 
recognizes that spouses have distinct preferences, but nevertheless 
implies that married couples would behave as predicted by the 
 
 6. Marilyn Manser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A 
Bargaining Analysis, 21 INT’L ECON. REV. 31 (1980). 
 7. Marjorie B. McElroy & Mary Jean Horney, Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: 
Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand, 22 INT’L ECON. REV. 333 (1981).  
 8. I have a particular attachment to these two papers because, as editor of the International 
Economic Review, I accepted them for publication at a time when editors of most economics 
journals would have rejected them. 
 9. See Manser & Brown, supra note 6, at 31. A utility function ―represents‖ preferences in 
the sense that it assigns numbers to alternatives in such a way that preferred alternatives are assigned 
higher numbers.  
 10. Robert A. Pollak, Samuelson’s ‘Dr. Jekyll and Mrs. Jekyll’ Problem: A Difficulty in 
the Concept of the Consumer, in SAMUELSONIAN ECONIMICS AND THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 116 (Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramratten & Aron A. Gottesman eds., 2006). 
 11. Paul A. Samuelson, Social Indifference Curves, 70 Q.J. ECON. 1, 9 (1956). In 
international trade theory, economists often simply assumed that the unitary model applied to 
countries. Samuelson argued that the correct approach was to analyze the behavior of 
individuals and then ―aggregate‖ individuals’ behavior to understand the behavior of countries 
or couples. See Pollak, supra note 10, at 117. 
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unitary model.
12
 The altruist model assumes that one family member, 
the ―altruist,‖ has the lion’s share of both resources and bargaining 
power, and concludes that the couple maximizes the altruist’s utility 
function subject to the couple’s resource constraint.13 In a 1988 study, 
I describe Becker’s altruist as the ―husband-father-dictator-patriarch‖ 
and argue that the source of his power is the implicit assumption that 
he can confront other family members with take-it-or-leave-it 
offers.
14
 Thus, I interpret the altruist model as an ―ultimatum 
game‖—a game in which one of the players, Becker’s altruist, 
proposes a division of a fixed total (e.g., a sum of money) between 
himself and the other player, the responder.
15
 The responder can 
either accept the proposed division, in which case each player 
receives the amount proposed, or reject it, in which case each player 
receives nothing.
16
 With this structure, economic theory predicts that 
if the proposer places no weight on ―fairness‖ or on the responder’s 
utility, then the responder will get her ―reservation utility‖ (i.e., the 
minimum utility that will keep her in the marriage) and the proposer 
will capture the entire ―surplus‖ generated by the marriage. If the 
proposer does place positive weight on the responder’s utility, then 
the responder will receive more than her reservation level of utility. 
Regardless of whether the proposer places zero weight or positive 
weight on the responder’s utility, the predicted division maximizes 
the altruist’s utility function, subject to the couple’s resource 
constraint.
17
 Thus, Becker does not simply assume the unitary model, 
but derives it from underlying assumptions about allocation within 
marriage. Unfortunately, the underlying assumptions are implausible. 
More plausible game theoretical bargaining models now play a 
central role in the economics of the family. These more plausible 
models make differing assumptions about the enforceability of 
bargains in ongoing marriages. Game theorists distinguish between 
 
 12. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 277–306 (enlarged ed. 1991) (setting 
out the altruistic model). 
 13. Id. at 279. 
 14. Robert A. Pollak, Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 
240, 242–43 (1988).  
 15. Id. at 243.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 242–43. 
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two classes of games: cooperative and noncooperative.
18
 Cooperative 
game theory assumes that players can make ―binding, costlessly-
enforceable agreements.‖19  Noncooperative game theory assumes 
that players cannot make such agreements.
20
 In noncooperative game 
theory, the only agreements players will fulfill are agreements that 
are in their interest to fulfill—in the language of game theory, 
―incentive-compatible‖ or ―self-enforcing‖ agreements.21 Lundberg 
and Pollak’s ―separate spheres‖ bargaining model is also a 
cooperative Nash bargaining model, but the default outcome is not 
divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage that 
reflects gender norms.
22
 
Economists’ definition of ―efficiency‖—formally, ―Pareto 
efficiency‖—is best approached by defining ―inefficiency.‖ A 
situation is inefficient if things can be rearranged so as to make 
everyone better off. For example, if a pie is divided between two 
people, a division that gives half to one person and one-third to the 
other is inefficient. An efficient allocation is one that is not 
inefficient. In the pie example, an allocation is efficient if and only if 
the shares add up to one. More generally, a situation is Pareto 
efficient if it is impossible to make one person better off without 
making someone else worse off.
23
  
 
 18. R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND 
CRITICAL SURVEY (1957). 
 19. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Models of 
Marriage, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 133 (1994) [hereinafter Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative 
Bargaining].  
 20. Id. at 133.  
 21. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) were the first to propose and 
analyze the behavior of married couples as a bargaining game. More precisely, both papers used the 
cooperative Nash bargaining model, and Manser and Brown also use the Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solution. Both the Manser-Brown and the McElroy-Horney models are ―divorce-threat‖ models (i.e., 
divorce is the default outcome if the couple fails to reach agreement). See Manser & Brown, supra 
note 6, at 38–40; McElroy & Horney, supra note 7, at 334–37. 
 22. Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining, supra note 19, at 133.  
 23. Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining Around the Hearth 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13142, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13142.pdf. 
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BARGAINING MODELS 
Both cooperative and noncooperative game theoretic models 
translate the divergent interests of the players into ―solutions‖ or 
―equilibria.‖24 Cooperative game theory does this by specifying a set 
of requirements (―axioms‖) that all solutions (―equilibria‖) must 
satisfy and defining the solution as all outcomes that satisfy all of the 
requirements in the set.
25
 Pareto efficiency is one of the requirements 
always imposed in cooperative game theory.
26
 
Three types of noncooperative bargaining models illustrate their 
variety: one-stage games, repeated games, and two-stage games. A 
solution or equilibrium in noncooperative games is defined by the 
requirement that each player’s ―strategy‖ is a ―best response‖ to the 
strategy of the other.
27
 In this sense, equilibrium ensures the 
compatibility of the decisions of the players. This notion of 
equilibrium is easiest to understand in the context of a one-stage 
game.  
1. One-stage games.
28
 In the family bargaining context, suppose 
that each spouse has control over his or her own resources (e.g., 
income or earnings). Each spouse decides how much of his or her 
own resources to spend on his or her private consumption and how 
much to contribute to a ―household public good.‖29 A household 
public good is a good that provides utility to both spouses—for 
example, the goods that are consumed by the couple’s child.30 
Economists call games of this sort ―voluntary contribution games.‖31 
 
 24. See LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 18. 
 25. Id.; Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining, supra note 19, at 132–37; Shelly 
Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 
139 (1996) [hereinafter Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution]. 
 26. See Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining, supra note 19, at 133. Some 
would argue that if there are no transaction costs and players can make binding, costlessly-
enforceable agreements, then equilibria must be Pareto efficient. The validity of this ―Coasian‖ 
claim depends on building the conclusion into the meaning of ―no transaction costs.‖ My own view 
is that transaction costs often are significant, that not all bargaining is efficient, and that players 
sometimes leave money on the table. 
 27. Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining, supra note 19, at 133.  
 28. Economists usually refer to ―one-stage‖ games as ―one-shot‖ games. See id. at 134. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Yoram Weiss & Robert J. Willis, Children as Collective Goods in Divorce 
Settlements, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 268 (1985).  
 31. Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining, supra note 19, at 134.  
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Both spouses are assumed to care about their own consumption and 
about the child’s consumption, but not about the consumption of the 
other spouse; thus, each spouse would like the other to increase his or 
her contribution to the child’s consumption.32 Under very general 
conditions, if both spouses contribute to the public good, then the 
equilibrium of the one-stage game is not Pareto efficient.
33
 More 
specifically, the equilibrium provides too little of the public good in 
the sense that both spouses would be better off if they both reduced 
their private consumption and increased their contributions to the 
public good. The intuition is that if a spouse—for definiteness, the 
husband—were to unilaterally reduce his own consumption to 
increase the child’s consumption by one unit, he must give up one 
unit of his own consumption.
34
 But if the spouses agree to coordinate 
to increase the child’s consumption by one unit, each spouse has to 
give up only half a unit of consumption.
35
 Somewhat more formally, 
in the one-stage game a ―strategy‖ for a spouse is a division of his or 
her own resources between his or her private consumption and a 
contribution to the child’s consumption.36 
2. Repeated games. Repeated games—games in which the same 
one-stage game is played over and over—are more plausible 
representations of many family bargaining situations than one-stage 
games.
37
 For example, suppose that in every period each spouse must 
decide how much of his or her own resources to spend on his or her 
private consumption and how much to contribute to the child’s 
consumption. In this example, the game being played over and over 
is the one-stage voluntary contribution game.
38
 Repeated games 
typically have multiple equilibria, and the analysis typically focuses 
on selecting a particular equilibrium from this set and arguing that it 
is the equilibrium. Although one-stage voluntary contribution games 
 
 32. Weiss & Willis, supra note 30.  
 33. Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining, supra note 19, at 135.  
 34. Id.  
 35. In a cooperative game, the spouses would agree to do this. 
 36. The prisoners’ dilemma is a well-known example of a one-stage game. In the prisoners’ 
dilemma, the (unique) equilibrium is one in which both prisoners confess. This outcome, however, 
is not Pareto efficient from the prisoners’ standpoint; both would be better off if neither confesses. 
 37. Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining, supra note 19, at 134–35.  
 38. Id. (proposing and analyzing this repeated voluntary contribution game).  
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lead to underprovision of the household public good, repeated games 
need not lead to underprovision.
39
 In a repeated game, bargains can 
be enforced by dynamic ―punishment strategies.‖40 For example, if 
the spouses agree on how much each is to contribute to the household 
public good and the husband fails to abide by the agreement in a 
particular period, then the wife can respond by refusing to contribute 
in the next period (or in the next two periods). Knowing that his wife 
will punish him if he fails to abide by the agreement, the husband will 
contribute the agreed upon amount.
41
  
3. Two-stage games. Two-stage games provide a framework for 
analyzing situations in which big, up-front decisions affect future 
bargaining power and the spouses are unable to make binding 
agreements about their future behavior (e.g., because courts will not 
enforce such bargains in ongoing marriages).
42
 Lundberg and Pollak 
propose and analyze the ―two-earner couple location problem‖ as a 
paradigmatic example.
43
 They consider spouses living in the Midwest 
who receive job offers on opposite coasts. They assume that if the 
spouses agree on a location and move there, both spouses know that 
they will play a bargaining game in the new location.
44
 The spouses 
also know that bargaining power depends on which location they 
move to.
45
 The wife, who would gain bargaining power by moving to 
California, cannot credibly commit to refrain from exploiting her 
bargaining advantage.
46
 Similarly, the husband, who would gain by 
moving to New York, cannot credibly commit to refrain from 
exploiting his bargaining advantage. Without the ability to make 
 
 39. Id. at 135.  
 40. Id.  
 41. The repeated prisoners’ dilemma game has multiple equilibria, including equilibria in 
which neither prisoner confesses. 
 42. Case, supra note 1.  
 43. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Efficiency in Marriage, 1 REV. ECON. 
HOUSEHOLD 153, 156–62 (2003) [hereinafter Lundberg & Pollak, Efficiency]. 
 44. Id. at 156.  
 45. Id. For example, suppose bargaining power depends on wage rates, and the wife has 
been offered a high wage in California, while the husband has been offered a high wage in New 
York. Pollak argues that bargaining power depends on wage rates. Robert A. Pollak, 
Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production 4 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11239, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w11239. 
 46. Lundberg & Pollak, Efficiency, supra note 43, at 157–58.  
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enforceable bargains, the couple might remain in the Midwest, even 
though moving would provide enough additional resources to make 
both spouses better off.
47
 Lundberg and Pollak argue that the two-
stage game provides a framework for analyzing many situations in 
which current decisions affect future bargaining power.
48
 For 
example, a husband cannot credibly commit to doing his share of 
child care if the couple has another child. Hence, the wife may refuse 
to have another child, even though having another child would make 
both spouses better off if the husband did his share of child care. 
Thus, the assumed inability to make binding, enforceable agreements 
is a crucial feature of the noncooperative two-stage games.  
ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT LAW 
Models highlight certain features of reality and ignore others. A 
literal interpretation of the simple two-stage bargaining model 
exaggerates both the likelihood that inefficiencies will arise and the 
extent to which legal enforceability of contracts would avoid these 
inefficiencies. The model exaggerates the likelihood of inefficiency 
because it fails to include three enforcement mechanisms that are 
more potent and less costly than legal enforceability: internalized 
norms, self-help, and (non-legal) third-party help. 
1. Economists treat internalized norms as a type of preference and 
recognize that, although conscience does not enforce all promises, it 
does enforce some.
49
 Economists generally ignore the possibility that 
players make unenforceable promises, characterizing them as ―cheap 
talk‖ which rational players will disregard.50 Internalized norms of 
promise-keeping allow some couples to make binding agreements 
even in the absence of external sanctions.
51
 
 
 47. Id. at 158. Alternatively, the job offers may be so attractive that the spouses move to 
opposite coasts, even though, if they could make binding agreements, they would stay together and 
move to one coast or the other. 
 48. Lundberg & Pollak, Efficiency, supra note 43, at 156. 
 49. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, American Family and Family Economics, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 3 (2007) [hereinafter Lundberg & Pollak, American Family].  
 50. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 103.  
 51. ―Norms‖ are an elastic notion, often encompassing both obligations enforced by the 
prospect of internal sanctions (e.g., you will feel guilty) and external sanctions (e.g., if you 
mistreat your wife, you will be beaten by her brothers and ostracized by the community). 
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2. Self-help by angry spouses who mistakenly relied on empty 
promises can range from ―harsh words and burnt toast,‖ in 
Bergstrom’s memorable phrase, to violence or threats of violence.52 
Even in an ultimatum game, experimental evidence indicates that 
responders punish proposers who make ―unfair‖ offers.53 In the 
ultimatum game, economic theory predicts that an egoistic proposer 
will offer the responder nothing or virtually nothing, and that a self-
interested responder will accept whatever unequal division she is 
offered.
54
 Experimental evidence contradicts these predictions: 
responders angrily reject unfair offers and, perhaps because proposers 
understand that responders will reject unfair offers, they offer 
substantially more than the zero or near zero predicted by the theory. 
3. Non-legal third-party help also provides incentives for spouses 
to keep promises, regardless of whether their promises are legally 
enforceable. In bargaining models of marriage, the only players are 
the spouses; the models depict married couples as isolated from other 
family members and from friends. In reality, spouses are embedded 
in often overlapping family and nonfamily networks—parents, 
children, siblings, friends, neighbors, co-workers, congregants—and 
spouses’ behavior is constrained by a desire to maintain relationships 
within these networks. Concern for these relationships may deter 
spouses from breaking promises or fully exploiting bargaining 
advantages.
55
  
 
Robert Ellickson argues that norms are more important than law, at least until the ―end game.‖ 
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 93 
(2008); Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 328 (2006). 
 I argue that, under some circumstances, ―endgame considerations may play a greater role in 
determining midgame allocation than Ellickson acknowledges.‖ Pollak, supra note 23, at 10. 
More specifically, for couples with minor children, legal rules regarding child custody and child 
support may be important and, for married couples, legal rules governing the division of marital 
property may be important. Id.  
 52. Theodore C. Bergstrom, Economics in a Family Way, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1903, 
1926 (1996). 
 53. See Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 253, 264 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); COLIN F. CAMERER, 
BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 9 (2003). 
 54. CAMERER, supra note 53, at 9.  
 55. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 76–79 (2000) (arguing that restricting 
individuals to a uniform marriage contract facilitates community enforcement of marital 
obligations). 
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Thus, even without legal enforceability, internalized norms, self-
help, and (non-legal) third-party help imply that inefficiency is less 
likely than the simple bargaining model suggests.  
THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ENFORCEABILITY 
Three features omitted from the simple two-stage model cause it 
to exaggerate the extent to which legal enforceability of bargains 
would avoid inefficiencies that would otherwise arise: (1) the costs of 
legal enforcement, (2) the nature of relational contracts, and (3) the 
reluctance of family members to enter into contracts.  
1. The cost of legal enforcement limits its effectiveness as a 
means of forcing spouses to honor promises. As Case emphasizes, 
high transaction costs imply that even if legal enforcement were 
available to spouses in ongoing marriages, it would not be a panacea 
because few couples would resort to the courts.
56
 Bargaining models 
usually focus on the polar cases of costless enforcement, as in 
cooperative games, and infinitely costly enforcement, as in two-stage 
games. Enforcement that is costly, but not infinitely costly, imposes 
limits or bounds on when spouses can break promises with 
impunity—some agreements are not worth enforcing. Hence, with 
high enforcement costs, the scope for opportunism is large.
57
 
2. Elizabeth and Robert Scott argue that marriage can be viewed 
as a ―relational contract.‖58 The enforcement of relational contracts, 
whether within families or between friends, depends more on 
internalized norms, self-help, and embeddedness in networks than on 
access to the courts.
59
 Contracts that prevent spouses from breaking 
 
 56. Case, supra note 1, at 250–51.  
 57. Oliver Williamson defines ―opportunism‖ as ―self-interest seeking with guile.‖ Oliver 
E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic 
Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 258–59 (1975). The ―outside option‖ of divorce imposes 
another bound. If one spouse resorts to legal enforcement, the other may respond by seeking a 
divorce. See POSNER, supra note 55, at 82. 
 Enforcement costs may be greater for one spouse than for the other. For example, a spouse 
who is an attorney may face lower enforcement costs than one who is not, and this has 
predictable distributional implications. 
 58. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1225, 1229 (1998). 
 59. Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT 256 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1990); POSNER, supra note 55, at 68–87.  
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promises and exploiting bargaining power in one dimension will 
channel exploitation into others. Contracts that prevent spouses from 
breaking promises and exploiting bargaining power in all dimensions 
are too costly to negotiate, draft, and enforce.
60
 Because contracts 
between spouses cannot deal with all relevant dimensions, such 
contracts are necessarily incomplete.  
3. The reluctance of family members to enter into contracts is a 
reflection of widely shared societal norms discouraging family 
contracts.
61
 The prevalence of such norms presumably explains why 
family contracts are unusual even when courts will enforce them. For 
example, elderly parents and adult children seldom enter into 
contracts regarding long-term care, and adult siblings seldom enter 
into contracts regarding the sharing of responsibility and costs of 
caring for disabled elderly parents. Prospective spouses are reluctant 
to enter into or even discuss prenuptial agreements specifying the 
division of assets in the event of divorce. Because suggesting a 
contract to family members signals a lack of trust, I would expect to 
see few contracts in ongoing marriages even if courts were willing to 
enforce such contracts.
62
 
CONCLUSION 
Would legal enforceability of bargains in ongoing marriages be 
better than the ―love-it-or-leave-it‖ rule? A literal reading of the 
simple two-stage bargaining model suggests that legal enforceability 
would avoid the inefficiencies that can arise in such models. A closer 
look reveals that the simple model exaggerates the likelihood that 
inefficiencies would arise in the absence of legal enforceability. This 
exaggeration occurs because the simple two-stage model ignores 
three mechanisms that, in some cases, would enable spouses to make 
binding agreements: internalized norms, self-help, and non-legal 
 
 60. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1225 (1998).  
 61. Lundberg & Pollak, Efficiency, supra note 43; Liliana Pezzin, Robert A. Pollak & 
Barbara S. Schone, Efficiency in Family Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving 
Decisions of Adult Children and Disabled Elderly Parents, 53 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 69 (2007). 
 62. The outcome would differ if legal enforceability led to a substantial change in norms. 
See POSNER, supra note 55, at 32–33 (discussing the capacity of law to alter norms). 
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third-party enforcement. The simple two-stage model also 
exaggerates the extent to which legal enforceability would enable 
spouses to avoid inefficiencies that would otherwise arise. Again 
there are three factors ignored in the simple model: the costs of legal 
enforcement, the nature of relational contracts, and the reluctance of 
family members to make explicit bargains with one another. My 
analysis suggests that Case’s proposal to make bargains in ongoing 
marriages legally enforceable would be only a modest improvement 
over ―love-it-or-leave-it.‖ 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/12
